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Since January 2012, international aviation has been included in the emissions trading scheme of the 
European Union (EU ETS), in accordance with EU Directive 2009/29 EC. From this year up to (at 
least) 2020, all flights starting from or landing at European airports are subject to the EU ETS, apart 
from a few exemptions. In 2012, the CO2 emission target for aviation is 97 per cent of the historical 
emissions of the years 2004-2006. From 2013 onwards, this reduction target will be lowered by 
another 2 per cent. In September 2010, the ICAO Assembly agreed to an exemption clause for 
market-based measures which could be applied to the EU ETS. Whether this should be the case is a 
controversial issue on the international political level. 
Model-based empirical estimations presented in this study indicate significant impacts of the EU ETS 
on airline costs, airfares and competition within the airline sector: in the year 2020, more than 50 per 
cent of the required allowances will have to be purchased by the airlines. Assuming an allowance 
price of 20 € per tonne of CO2, the resulting costs for the aviation sector will amount to about 20,502 
million € in 2012-2020. In addition, competitive distortions can be expected if the ICAO exemption 
clause is introduced to the EU ETS. 
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1. Introduction 
From the year 2012 up to at least 2020, a number of energy-intense sectors will be subject to 
ambitious CO2 reduction goals within the European Union. International aviation will be one of 
these sectors since, apart from a few exemptions, all flights starting from or landing at any European 
airport will be included in the EU emissions trading system (EU ETS) from 2012 onwards. In the year 
2012, the total quantity of allowances allocated to aircraft operators will be equal to 97 per cent of the 
historical aviation emissions of the years 2004-2006 (so-called ‘cap’) (Council of the European Union, 
2009a). From 2013 onwards, this reduction target will be lowered by another 2 per cent (Directive 
2008/101/EC; Council of the European Union, 2009a). Non-CO2 impacts of aviation, albeit 
considered as substantial contributors to the climate-change effect of aviation as shown in Lee et al. 
(2009), have so far not been included in the EU ETS, due to considerable uncertainties associated 
with their measurement (de F. Forster et al. 2006).  
A number of studies have been published in the recent years on the economic impacts of introducing 
the EU ETS for air transport, e. g. by Forsyth, Dwyer and Spurr (2007), Boon et al. (2007), Scheelhaase 
et al. (2010), Schaefer et al. (2010), Anger and Köhler (2010), Forsyth (2011) and Yuen and Zhang 
(2011). These studies mainly focus on the economic impacts on the air transport sector in the short 
and medium term respectively. In addition, specific aspects are analysed, such as the impact of the 
EU ETS on tourism (Forsyth, Dwyer and Spurr (2007)) or the impacts of introducing the trading 
scheme on full-service network airlines from European versus non-European countries (Schaefer et 
al. (2010)). Anger and Köhler (2010) compare the main findings of the recent studies on including air 
transport in the EU ETS. Brueckner and Zhang (2010) analyse the effects of emissions charges on air 
fares, service quality and the longer-term impacts on aircraft design. Yuen and Zhang (2011) 
investigate the effects of unilateral greenhouse gas emissions regulation on airline competition and 
global emissions. The two latter papers follow a theoretical modelling approach.  
While most studies in literature tend to focus on short/medium-term impacts of the EU ETS, our 
paper investigates the effects of the EU ETS on the aviation sector as such up to the year 2020. Unlike 
most other studies, this will be conducted assuming the current legal framework in detail and by 
employing a newly-enhanced simulation model. Therefore, the objective of this paper is to 
investigate the cost impacts of integrating air transport into the EU emissions trading scheme in the 
time period 2012-2020. In addition, the cost impacts of the possible introduction of the ICAO 
(International Civil Aviation Organisation) exemption clause to the EU ETS will be investigated for 
the first time in literature. The findings of this paper are an important input for European and 
international air transport politics.  
In order to investigate these questions, a DLR-developed air traffic and emissions simulation model 
is employed. This model has been enhanced by a new module simulating the future development of 
the worldwide fleet and resulting improvements in fuel efficiency. As a result, it can be shown that 
the impacts of the EU ETS on costs, fares and on competition within the airline sector will be 
substantial, especially in the longer term. Furthermore, the CO2 effects will be remarkable: if the 
European Commission politically succeeds in integrating European as well as non-European carriers 
into the EU ETS, roughly one third of aviation’s global CO2 emissions will be regulated. 
This paper is organized as follows: initially, an overview of the EU legislation on emissions trading 
for air transport for the period 2012-2020 is provided (section 2). The recent political developments 
on this subject on ICAO level as well as UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change) level are also presented in this section. This is followed by a brief description of our 
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methodology (section 3). Section 4 shows and discusses the main modelling results: the cost and CO2 
impacts of the inclusion of air transport in the EU ETS in the time period 2012-2020 and the cost 
impacts of the ICAO exemption clause. On this basis, conclusions are drawn regarding the short and 
longer-term impacts of the EU ETS on competition between EU and non-EU airlines (section 5). 
2. Political Background 
2.1 EU legislation for the inclusion of air transport in the EU emissions trading 
scheme (EU ETS) 
Two EU Directives make provisions for the inclusion of air transport in the EU ETS: while EU 
Directive 2008/101/EC (Council of the European Union, 2009a) adopts most regulations for the year 
2012, Directive 2009/29/EC (Council of the European Union, 2009b) contains regulations for the 
period 2013-2020. These Directives apply to the 27 EU Member States and the non-EU States 
Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein, which joined the EU ETS in 2008. 
In the European Union and in Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein, the EU ETS will cover all flights 
departing from or arriving at European airports from 2012 onwards. This way, both European and 
non-European airlines will participate in the EU ETS. Aircraft operators will be obliged to hold and 
surrender allowances for CO2 emissions. EU Allowances (EUAs) as well as permits from the Kyoto-
based “Clean Development Mechanism” (CERs) and “Joint Implementation” (ERUs) will be accepted 
for compliance. 
The Clean Development Mechanism allows emission-reduction projects in developing countries to 
earn certified emission reduction (CER) credits. CERs can be traded and sold, and used by 
industrialized countries to meet some of their targets under the Kyoto Protocol. Joint 
Implementation, as defined in Article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol, allows a country with an emission 
reduction or limitation commitment under the Protocol (Annex B Party) to earn emission reduction 
units (ERUs) from an emission-reduction or emission removal project in another Annex B Party. Both 
CDM and JI are understood politically as being additional to emission reduction measures within the 
European Union. 
In the year 2012, the total quantity of allowances allocated to aircraft operators will be equivalent to 
97 per cent of the historical aviation emissions of the years 2004-2006 (so-called overall “cap”). This 
“cap” will be lowered by another 2 per cent in 2013. Allowances allocated to aircraft operators will be 
valid within the aviation sector only. However, it will be possible to purchase additional permits. In 
2012, aircraft operators may use emission permits from “Joint Implementation” and “Clean 
Development Mechanism” for up to 15 per cent of the number of allowances they are required to 
surrender for this year. In the period 2013 until 2020, the use of these Kyoto instruments will be 
reduced to 1.5 per cent. This figure was a political compromise agreed upon after long and 
controversial negotiations. Flights from third countries, which have introduced ‘equivalent’ CO2 
reducing measures, can be excluded from the EU ETS. It will be up to the European Commission to 
decide whether a third country measure is equivalent (Council of the European Union, 2009b). On 
this issue, the future conflict potential could be significant. 
Exemptions from the EU ETS will be granted for flights performed within the framework of public 
service obligations (PSO) on routes within outermost regions or on PSO routes with an annual 
capacity of fewer than 30,000 seats. Also excluded from the EU ETS will be flights performed by 
commercial air transport operators operating either fewer than 243 flights per four-month period for 
three consecutive four-month periods (so-called ‘de minimis’ clause) or flights with total CO2-
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emissions of less than 10,000 tonnes per year. The ‘de minimis’ clause was introduced with the goal 
of reducing the administrative costs for operators with a low number of flights to and from Europe. 
Another exemption refers to flights performed under visual flight rules, amongst some other 
exemptions. 
2.2 Recent developments on international level 
On the level of the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO), which is the specialized UN 
agency for international civil aviation, market-based measures for the limitation of CO2 emissions 
have been discussed for a number of years. In May 2009, the ICAO GIACC (Group on International 
Aviation and Climate Change) adopted a ‘Programme of Action’ with the following main goals: “An 
annual improvement of the fuel efficiency of 2 per cent over the medium term until 2020. For the 
long term, the GIACC recommends an aspirational global fuel efficiency improvement rate of 2 per 
cent per annum from 2021 to 2050” (International Civil Air Transport Organisation ICAO, 2009a). In 
addition, the ICAO Council should establish a process to develop a framework for market-based 
measures in international aviation. These goals were agreed upon in the 37th ICAO Assembly in 
October 2010. Furthermore, the 37th ICAO Assembly agreed on an exemption provision for market-
based measures which could be applied to the EU ETS. The cost impacts of this exemption clause are 
investigated in section 4.3. 
Concerning the EC Directives for the inclusion of air transport in the EU ETS, strongly diverting 
views of non-EU countries were expressed at the ICAO Assemblies in 2007 and 2010. Unlike the EU 
Member States, most other ICAO contracting states believe that an inclusion of non-EU carriers is 
only possible on the basis of a mutual agreement. Such mutual agreements do not exist to date. Both 
parties argue on the basis of the Chicago Convention on Civil Aviation. This controversial issue is 
still unsolved. In December 2009, the Air Transport Association of America (ATA) and the US 
airlines American, Continental and United commenced legal action in the UK against the inclusion of 
aviation in the ETS. The claimants brought the case in the UK because the UK is the administering 
EU Member State for these airlines. The case was referred to the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) 
(Bisset and Crowhurst, 2011). In December 2011, the Court of Justice of the EU decided that the 
application of the EU ETS to all airlines is legal (Court of Justice of the EU, 2011). 
As of September 2012, in many countries opposed to the EU ETS, countermeasures and restrictions 
on European airlines are in preparation, such as special taxes and traffic rights limitations. In China, 
approval for orders of Airbus aircraft worth US$12 billion has been suspended. As a response, in a 
joint letter Airbus and eight European Airlines called upon the governments of France, Germany, the 
UK and Spain to stop escalating a possible trade conflict with the countries opposing the EU ETS 
(Airbus, 2012). 
On the level of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the 17th 
Conference of the Parties (COP17) took place in Durban in November/December 2011. The outcome 
was the so-called ‘Durban Platform for Enhanced Action’, in which the need for enhanced action to 
limit climate change is recognized. However, agreement on immediate action on state level could not 
be reached. International aviation is not mentioned in the ‘Durban Platform’ (UNFCCC, 2012). 
3. Methodology 
The simulation model employed in this study to analyse the cost impacts of the EU ETS is a chain of 
software tools covering aircraft flight simulation, air traffic simulation and forecast scenarios. A 
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schematic of the automated tool chain is presented in Figure 1. It calculates transport performance (in 
terms of revenue passenger-kilometres and tonne-kilometres), fuel consumption and emissions of air 
traffic in a bottom-up approach, i.e. starting from a database of flight movements and calculating 
emissions for each flight. As will be described below, this approach is followed both for historical 
analyses and for the emissions forecast. More details on the tool chain and its individual modules are 
found in Schaefer (2012). 
 
Figure 1. Schematic of model architecture 
Source: Schaefer (2012). 
 
VarMission is an aircraft performance tool developed at the DLR Institute of Propulsion Technology. 
It is capable of calculating fuel burn and CO2 emissions of aircraft on flight mission level. Using the 
BADA database of aircraft models hosted by EUROCONTROL (EUROCONTROL, 2011), VarMission 
covers a broad range of large transport aircraft. Besides BADA, aircraft models from other sources 
and in different formats can be used with this module. Simulation models for the most important 
aircraft types of the near future have been developed at DLR and are used to supplement BADA for 
this study. This includes models of the Boeing 787-800 and 747-8, the Airbus A350XWB-900 and the 
Airbus A320 NEO (New Engine Option) family. The models of these aircraft types are based on 
estimations of their characteristic weights (e.g. empty weight, maximum take-off weight) and 
aerodynamic properties, while fuel flow is obtained from engine models simulated by DLR’s 
VarCycle engine performance software. Aircraft types without available simulation models are 
represented by the most similar available model for the purpose of emissions calculation. As will be 
described below, VarMission is used by the Air Traffic Emissions Module and the Air Traffic 
Forecast Module to estimate fuel burn and emissions for each flight from a database of flight 
movements.  
The Air Traffic Emissions Module employed in this study is based on worldwide flight schedules 
compiled by the Official Airline Guide (OAG, 2000-2010), supplemented by a DLR-developed 
schedule for cargo flights that are not contained in OAG. Initially, the flight schedules are converted 
into a database of flight movements. An engine type and a load factor are assigned to each flight 
from the movements data, using statistics on engines from the ASCEND fleets database (ASCEND, 
2011) and load factor data from ICAO (ICAO, 2009b). Provided with this information, the module 
relies on VarMission to estimate fuel burn and emissions for each flight. As details on the flight 
trajectories are not available from the flight schedules, VarMission initially assumes “standard” 
trajectories without horizontal or vertical inefficiencies. In a following step, inefficiencies from Air 
Traffic Management (ATM) are accounted for, which influence fuel burn and emissions of global air 
traffic. For this purpose, the Air Traffic Module assumes flight inefficiencies from ATM including 
ground-based taxi delays as well as horizontal and vertical flight inefficiencies as estimated by a 
report from the Civil Air Navigation Services Organization (CANSO, 2008). A schematic of the Air 
Traffic Emissions Module is shown in Figure 2.  
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Figure 2. Schematic of the Air Traffic Module 
Source: Schaefer (2012). 
 
The Air Traffic Forecast Module predicts fuel burn and emissions of air traffic until the year 2020. 
Using a common database structure with the Air Traffic Emissions Module, the model applies 
regional traffic growth rates from the Airbus Global Market Forecast 2011-2030 (GMF; Airbus, 2011) 
to given flight movements for the base year 2010. A flight movements sample covering the month of 
September is currently used for the forecast, in order to limit the database size1. A fleet forecast 
model simulates the future development of the worldwide fleet composition based on historical fleet 
statistics, typical aircraft retirement curves, assumptions on new aircraft types and aircraft and 
engine market shares. In a year-by-year forecast based on Airbus (2011), traffic growth and fleet 
rollover are simulated and applied to the base year flight movements. Similar to the approach in the 
Air Traffic Emissions Module, VarMission aircraft models are finally employed to determine fuel 
burn and emissions of each flight. Furthermore, moderate improvements of load factors and ATM 
efficiency are assumed by the forecast model: an average passenger load factor of 80% and an 
average weight load factor of 68% are assumed for the year 2020. Regarding air traffic management, 
targets for future ATM efficiency set by CANSO (CANSO, 2008) are assumed to be met. Figure 3 
presents a schematic of the Air Traffic Forecast Module.  
Simplifications are made in the aforementioned model, which lead to an underestimation of fuel 
burn and emissions compared to reality. Most importantly, standard atmospheric conditions 
according to the International Standard Atmosphere (ISA) are assumed for flight simulation, 
neglecting the effects of wind and local temperature deviations. The resulting underprediction of fuel 
burn and emissions was estimated at 2-4% on average according to Schaefer (2012). In addition, 
effects from airframe and engine deterioration with time (aircraft aging) are not simulated, which 
may result in an additional underestimation of fuel consumption in the order of 1-3%. Furthermore, 
airlines sometimes tanker fuel on certain routes in order to take advantage of fuel price differences 
between origin and destination airports. Fuel tankering, which occurs mostly on short-distance 
flights, also contributes to higher fuel burn and emissions in real-world air traffic. In total, an 
underestimation of fuel consumption and emissions in the order of 5-10% can be expected for model 
results.  
                                                      
1 In the forecast, yearly results are up-scaled from September results assuming respective ratios of the year 2010. 
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Figure 3. Schematic of the Air Traffic Forecast Module  
Source: Schaefer (2012). 
4. Modelling results 
4.1 CO2 emissions and transport performance 
The historical CO2 emissions’ of the years 2004-2006 are the bases for the EU ETS cost estimations. To 
calculate transport performance, fuel burn and CO2 emissions for scheduled aviation in the past, the 
Air Traffic Module has been used. Flight schedules provided by the Official Airline Guide (OAG, 
2000-2010) for the years 2000 and 2003-2010 plus a self-developed cargo flight plan for European 
airports have served as primary sources of flight movement data. Table 1 summarizes the main 
results.  
Table 1. Historical transport performance und CO2 emissions of flights to and from European 
Airports 
Year 
RTK in billion 
(modelled) 
CO2 emissions in million tonnes 
(modelled) 
2004 178.1 170.1 
2005 198.1 184.0 
2006 209.0 191.7 
2007 226.4 202.9 
2008 229.8 208.6 
2009 209.7 196.4 
2010 224.8 204.0 
 Source: DLR model results.  
 
According to our model, the historical CO2 emissions of the years 2004-2006 are 181.9 million tonnes, 
on average. If the European Commission politically succeeds in integrating European and non-
European airlines into the trading schemes, roughly a third of global aviation’s CO2 emissions will be 
regulated, according to our simulation. 
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Interestingly, our estimations of the historical emissions differ noticeably from the estimates 
published by the European Commission in March 2011: the Commission decided these emissions to 
be 219 million tonnes on the basis of EUROCONTROL data and information on actual fuel 
consumption voluntarily provided by about 30 aircraft operators (Commission of the European 
Communities, 2011). An in-depth analysis of our estimates revealed that these differences can only 
partly be explained by a lack of data on flight movements, weather conditions, APU fuel use and 
other information not publicly available. This issue must remain unsolved until more quantitative 
data concerning this highly political figure is published by the European Commission. As of 
September 2012, this has not yet been the case. 
According to our model, about 176.5 million emission permits will be created for the aviation sector 
(97 per cent of the historical emissions) in the year 2012, with each owner of one allowance having 
the right to emit one tonne of CO2. 85 per cent of all allowances will be issued for free while the 
remaining 26.5 million permits will be auctioned. Assuming a future allowance price of 20 / 40 € per 
tonne of CO2, governments of the EU Member States will receive between 529 and 1,059 million € 
from the auctioning in 2012 alone. From 2013 onwards, the amount of allowances created for the 
aviation sector will be lowered by another 2 per cent due to the reduction of the ‘cap’. According to 
EU legislation, a special reserve of 5.2 million tonnes has to be subtracted. Airlines with an 
extraordinary growth may apply for this special reserve. This results in a yearly amount of 172.8 
million emission permits in the period 2013-2020.  
To estimate future air transport performance, fuel burn and CO2 emissions, the Air Traffic Forecast 
Module is used. The model simulates traffic growth and fleet rollover and estimates future CO2 
emissions from aviation. The main results are presented in Table 2. 
Table 2. Development of EU ETS for aviation key determinants in the timeframe 2012-2020, in 
million tonnes 
Year 
CO2 emissions 
from aviation 
Allowances 
created for 
aviation  
Free allocation of 
allowances*  
Auctioned 
allowances  
Allowances 
purchased from 
other sectors  
2012 222.6 176.5 150.0 26.5  46.1 
2013 232.2 172.8 146.9 25.9  59.4 
2014 242.0 172.8 146.9 25.9  69.2 
2015 251.9 172.8 146.9 25.9  79.1 
2016 261.5 172.8 146.9 25.9  88.7 
2017 271.0 172.8 146.9 25.9  98.2 
2018 280.3 172.8 146.9 25.9 107.5 
2019 289.7 172.8 146.9 25.9 116.9 
2020 299.1 172.8 146.9 25.9 126.3 
Source: DLR model results. * 2013-2020: including the special reserve. 
 
4.2 Impacts on airlines’ costs 
An important factor for the cost impact of the EU ETS on airlines is the delta between the amount of 
allowances issued for free and the amount of allowances needed for maintaining operations in the 
future. Table 2 provides an overview of the expected development of these figures in the timeframe 
2012 to 2020. The amount of allowances which have to be purchased increases constantly due to the 
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assumed sectoral growth rates. In 2020, more than 50 per cent of the allowances needed by the 
airlines will have to be purchased.  
By multiplying the number of purchased allowances by an assumed permit price, the cost impact of 
the EU ETS can be estimated. Table 3 shows the cost impacts at an assumed permit price of 20 € per 
tonne of CO2, Table 4 presents the cost impacts at an assumed permit price of 40 € per tonne of CO2. 
Table 3. Cost impacts of the EU ETS for aviation, 20 € per tonne, in million € 
Year 
Value of total 
allowances needed 
Value of allowances 
created for aviation 
Value of free 
allowances*  
Auction revenues for 
EU Member States 
Value of allowances 
to be purchased 
2012  4,452  3,529  3,000   529  1,452 
2013  4,644  3,456  2,938   518  1,706 
2014  4,840  3,456  2,938   518  1,902 
2015  5,038  3,456  2,938   518  2,100 
2016  5,230  3,456  2,938   518  2,292 
2017  5,420  3,456  2,938   518  2,482 
2018  5,606  3,456  2,938   518  2,668 
2019  5,794  3,456  2,938   518  2,856 
2020  5,982  3,456  2,938   518  3,044 
Total 47,006 31,181 26,504 4,677 20,502 
Source: DLR model results. * 2013-2020: including the special reserve. 
 
Table 4. Cost impacts of the EU ETS for aviation, 40 € per tonne, in million € 
Year 
Value of total 
allowances needed 
Value of allowances 
created for aviation 
Value of free 
allowances*  
Auction revenues for 
EU Member States 
Value of allowances 
to be purchased 
2012   8,904  7,058  6,000 1,059  2,904 
2013   9,288  6,913  5,876 1,037  3,412 
2014   9,680  6,913  5,876 1,037  3,804 
2015 10,076  6,913  5,876 1,037  4,200 
2016 10,460  6,913  5,876 1,037  4,584 
2017 10,840  6,913  5,876 1,037  4,964 
2018 11,212  6,913  5,876 1,037  5,336 
2019 11,588  6,913  5,876 1,037  5,712 
2020 11,964  6,913  5,876 1,037  6,088 
Total 94,012 62,362 53,008 9,354 41,004 
Source: DLR model results. * 2013-2020: including the special reserve. 
 
Previous work conducted by the authors revealed that the cost impacts of the EU ETS will affect 
some groups of airlines more than others (see Schaefer et al., 2010 and Scheelhaase et al., 2010 for a 
full description). Particularly the European network carriers will suffer from a competitive 
disadvantage under the EU ETS in comparison to their competitors based outside the EU. On 
average, the share of allowances to be acquired by these EU-based carriers will be significantly 
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higher than for non-EU airlines. This can be explained by the fact that EU-based full service network 
carriers will have to operate their relatively inefficient short-haul feeder flights under the EU ETS, 
while most other carriers from outside the EU operate only long-haul flights with high load factors to 
and from Europe, which are generally more fuel-efficient than short-haul flights. With these 
empirical findings, earlier works based on theoretical models (e.g. Brueckner and Zhang, 2010 and 
Yuen and Zhang, 2011) were widely supported.  
The cost increases presented in Tables 3 and 4 may have demand side effects as the aircraft operators 
could decide to pass-on the additional costs to the passengers in the form of higher ticket prices 
and/or freight rates. However, we refrained from modelling the demand side effects because these 
effects are determined by the price elasticities of demand which show a broad range of possible 
values in literature (e. g. Brons, 2002 and Gillen, 2004). Therefore, possible reactions of the demand 
side and of the airlines facing these reactions cannot be presented here. For this reason, the numbers 
given in this paper may be lower in reality.  
Also, the impacts of the EU ETS on route networks will be limited. This is can be explained as 
follows: an additional stop immediately outside the borders of the EU would, on the one hand, 
significantly shorten the distance flown under the EU ETS and hence minimize the emissions for 
which allowances must be surrendered. On the other hand, however, the disadvantages for airlines 
getting involved in this kind of strategy are substantial: journey times would increase, reducing the 
attractiveness of services for time-sensitive high-yield passengers and resulting in a potential loss in 
revenues. Moreover, intermediate stops also come at a cost. For instance, an intermediate landing in 
Istanbul with an Airbus A340-600 en-route to a destination in South East Asia would cost an airline 
3000 € in airport charges alone (DHMI, 2012), plus costs for ground handling as well as the 
additional costs for cockpit and cabin crews - in the case of maximum working hours being exceeded 
as result of the stopover. Such a strategy would only be beneficial to airlines from a financial 
perspective if carbon prices are higher than reasonably expected for the foreseeable future. 
4.3 Competitive impacts of different exemption clauses  
In October 2010, the 37th ICAO Assembly agreed to an exemption provision for market-based 
measures, amongst others, as mentioned above. This exemption clause differs noticeably from the 
one applied in the current EU ETS framework (so-called EU de minimis clause, see section 2). 
According to Article 15, ICAO Resolution A37-19, the ICAO Assembly “Resolves on a de minimis 
threshold of international aviation activity, consistent with the guiding principles in the Annex, of 1 per cent of 
total revenue tonne kilometres to MBMs (Market-Based Measures) as follows: 
a) commercial aircraft operators of States below the threshold should qualify for exemption for application of 
MBMs that are established on national, regional and global levels; and 
b) States and regions implementing MBMs may wish to also consider an exemption for other small aircraft 
operators.” (ICAO, 2010). 
An application of the ICAO exemption clause in the current EU ETS has been under discussion both 
on ICAO and EU level since October 2010. If this clause is applied, which cost and competition 
impacts can be expected? To investigate this question, the ICAO provisions have to be substantiated. 
In line with the explanation given by ICAO (ICAO, 2011a), two different interpretations of the ICAO 
exemption provision are possible:  
Interpretation a): All individual states whose commercial operators account for less than 1 per cent of 
global international traffic in terms of revenue tonne kilometres (RTK) will be exempted.  
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Interpretation b): All individual commercial aircraft operators who account for less than 1 per cent of 
global international traffic in terms of revenue tonne kilometres will be exempted (ICAO, 2011a). 
As a first step, we investigated the empirical distribution of the global international air traffic 
revenue tonne kilometres (RTKs) according to both interpretations of the ICAO exemption clause. 
For this purpose, ICAO data for the year 2010 (ICAO, 2011b) was analysed. The results show a strong 
disparity: assuming interpretation a), almost 60 per cent of the global international RTKs can be 
assigned to only 10 states/territories (USA, Germany, United Arab Emirates, UK, Republic of Korea, 
China, France, Hong Kong, Singapore and Japan). Only 24 of all 190 ICAO Contracting 
States/territories can then be assigned more than 1 per cent of the global RTKs. Results for 
interpretation b) show a strong disparity as well. According to the latter interpretation, only 29 
aircraft operators would have to fulfil the EU ETS obligations while all other airlines would be 
exempted. Tables 5 and 6 provide an overview of these results.  
Table 5. States Ranking according to the share of global international air traffic revenue tonne 
kilometres (RTK) in 2010
Rank State/Territory RTK (million) % Share 
1 United States 59,641 14.34 
2 Germany 28,489 6.85 
3 United Arab Emirates 28,347 6.81 
4 United Kingdom 23,053 5.54 
5 Republic of Korea 20,724 4.98 
6 China 18,871 4.54 
7 France 17,837 4.29 
8 Hong Kong 16,189 3.89 
9 Singapore 14,788 3.55 
10 Japan 14,470 3.48 
11 Netherlands 13,845 3.33 
12 Republic of Ireland 9,225 2.22 
13 Canada 8,017 1.93 
14 Qatar 7,723 1.86 
15 Russian Federation 7,614 1.83 
16 Spain 7,424 1.78 
17 Thailand 7,359 1.77 
18 Australia 6,721 1.62 
19 Turkey 6,139 1.48 
20 Malaysia 6,137 1.48 
21 India 5,990 1.44 
22 Switzerland 5,299 1.27 
23 Luxembourg 5,234 1.26 
24 Italy 4,383 1.05 
25-190 Other  72,466 17.42 
1-190 Total 415,985 100.00 
Source: ICAO (2011b) and own calculations. 
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Table 6. Airlines Ranking according to the share of global international air traffic revenue tonne 
kilometres (RTK) in 2010 
Rank Airline State RTK (million) % Share 
1 Lufthansa Germany 20,231 4.86 
2 Emirates United Arab Emirates 20,013 4.81 
3 Air France France 15,400 3.70 
4 Korean Air Republic of Korea 14,856 3.57 
5 Cathay Pacific Hong Kong SAR 14,468 3.48 
6 Delta United States 13,585 3.27 
7 British Airways United Kingdom 11,801 2.84 
8 KLM Netherlands 11,408 2.74 
9 Singapore Airlines Singapore 10,240 2.46 
10 American United States 9,666 2.32 
11 United United States 8,995 2.16 
12 Qatar Airways Qatar 7,723 1.86 
13 Thai Airways Thailand 7,652 1.84 
14 Federal Express United States 7,469 1.80 
15 Ryanair Ireland 7,370 1.77 
16 Continental United States 6,996 1.68 
17 Qantas Australia 6,959 1.67 
18 Air Canada Canada 6,506 1.56 
19 JAL Japan 6,369 1.53 
20 Air China China 6,169 1.48 
21 Asiana Republic of Korea 5,689 1.37 
22 Malaysian Airlines Malaysia 5,543 1.33 
23 Etihad United Arab Emirates 5,482 1.32 
24 Iberia Spain 5,354 1.29 
25 United Parcel United States 5,342 1.28 
26 THY Turkey 4,967 1.19 
27 Cargolux Luxembourg 4,901 1.18 
28 Virgin Atlantic United Kingdom 4,532 1.09 
29 Swiss Switzerland 4,237 1.02 
Other  156,060 38.00 
Total  415,985 100,00 
Source: ICAO (2011b) and own calculations. 
 
If the ICAO exemption clause is introduced to the EU ETS, considerable economic and CO2 impacts 
can be expected. This refers to the competition between airlines and to a likely carbon leakage:  
Competitive distortions will arise when an airline or a group of airlines has to bear higher operating 
costs while their competitors on certain routes or city-pairs will not have to suffer from cost 
increases. Under the EU ETS, operating costs will rise due to the obligation to purchase CO2
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allowances. Ceteris paribus, this will lead to a decrease in operating results for those carriers under 
the EU ETS. Table 7 shows estimations of the costs associated with fulfilling the EU ETS regulations 
for the airlines of the 24 states subject to the EU ETS (interpretation a)). Table 8 presents the costs for 
the 29 individual airlines subject to the EU ETS according to interpretation b) of the ICAO exemption 
clause. 
Table 7. CO2 emissions and associated costs for airlines under the EU ETS according to  
interpretation a) of the ICAO exemption clause in the year 2020 
CO2 in 
million 
t 
 
 
Percentage of 
allowances to be 
purchased at  
auction and on 
market 
Allowances to be 
purchased at auction 
and on market in 
million t 
Costs for allowances 
to be purchased in 
million €  
(20 €/t CO2) 
Costs for allowances 
to be purchased in 
million €  
(40 €/t CO2) 
Costs for allowances 
per RTK in € (20 € 
per t CO2 /40 € per t 
CO2) 
237.85 0.51 121.04 2420.8 4841.6 0.0074/0.0148 
Source: DLR model results. 
 
Table 8. CO2 emissions and associated costs for airlines under the EU ETS according to  
interpretation b) of the ICAO exemption clause in the year 2020 
CO2 in 
million 
t 
 
 
Percentage of 
allowances to be 
purchased at  
auction and on 
market 
Allowances to be 
purchased at auction 
and on market in 
million t 
Costs for allowances 
to be purchased in 
million €  
(20 €/t CO2) 
Costs for allowances 
to be purchased in 
million €  
(40 €/t CO2) 
Costs for allowances 
per RTK in € (20 € 
per t CO2 /40 € per t 
CO2) 
152.31 0.51 77.51 1550.2 3100.4 0.0072/0.0144 
Source: DLR model results. 
 
In absolute terms, airlines under the EU ETS will have to bear additional operating costs of about 
2420.8 million € p. a. (according to interpretation a) of the ICAO exemption clause) or 1550.2 million 
€ (interpretation b), under the assumption of an allowance price of 20 €/t CO2 in the year 2020. An 
analysis of the change in unit operating costs (costs per RTK) reveals that the airlines under the EU 
ETS will have to cope with a cost increase of 0.74 or 0.72 € Ct. per RTK, at an allowance price of 20 
€/t CO2. In relation to the total operating costs per RTK of about 10 – 12 € Ct. in the year 2006 
(International Air Transport Association, 2006), the EU ETS would lead to an increase in unit 
operating costs of 6.7 per cent (interpretation a) of the ICAO exemption clause) or 6.5 per cent 
(interpretation b)). Ceteris paribus, this will lead to a decrease in operating results of the airlines 
under the EU ETS. Obviously, interpretation a) of the ICAO exemption clause will lead to a larger 
financial burden than interpretation b). This can be explained by a lower ratio of CO2 per RTK of the 
world’s most successful 29 airlines in terms of RTK in the year 2010 (ICAO exemption clause 
interpretation b)). It shows that this group of airlines operates more energy-efficiently on average 
than the group of airlines according to interpretation a) of the ICAO exemption clause. 
The increase of unit operating costs for the airlines under the EU ETS will cause competitive 
distortions because most carriers under the EU ETS compete with carriers exempted on certain 
routes or city-pairs. This is the case with, for instance, Lufthansa: in 2010, Lufthansa served airports 
in 87 countries. According to interpretation a) of the ICAO exemption clause, carriers from 64 of 
these 87 countries would be excluded from the EU ETS. In the majority of cases, airlines from these 
64 countries are competing on route level with Lufthansa. Roughly 20 per cent of Lufthansa’s total 
ASKs are offered on such routes on which airlines excluded by the ICAO exemption clause are 
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Lufthansa’s competitors according to our calculations on country-pair level. If the ICAO exemption 
clause interpretation b) is applied, competitive disadvantages for the carriers under the EU ETS will 
be even more likely as competitors from the same country would be exempted as well. Again, this is 
the case for Lufthansa. As an example: while Lufthansa would have to comply with the EU ETS 
rules, amongst others, airberlin, Germany’s second-largest airline and Lufthansa’s direct competitor 
on a number of domestic, continental and intercontinental routes respectively city-pairs, would be 
exempted. The same discriminating situation applies to a number of other airlines in the world. At 
the end of the day, airlines included in the EU ETS will suffer from competitive disadvantages 
compared to their competitors excluded from the EU ETS. As a result, competitive distortions are 
likely. 
A carbon leakage is the indirect effect of emission reduction policies or activities in the trading 
scheme(s) under consideration which leads to a rise in emissions elsewhere (Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change, 1996). In some cases, global emissions could be even higher compared to 
the situation before the introduction of market-based measures. This can be explained as follows:  
If the ICAO exemption clause was introduced to the EU ETS, some strategies would, from an airline 
point of view, appear promising as a means of absconding from the EU ETS requirements. For 
instance, airline groups could, to a certain extent, shift operations from airlines under the EU ETS to 
airlines being excluded from these regulations. This strategy is possible both within a corporate 
group and within an airlines alliance, by code-share agreements. If the ICAO exemption clause 
interpretation a) is applied, the Lufthansa group, for example, could either shift intra-European 
flights from Lufthansa to its subsidiaries Brussels Airlines or Austrian Airlines or serve destinations 
like Frankfurt - Johannesburg by code-share agreement with South African Airways. As carriers 
from Belgium, Austria and South Africa will be excluded from the EU ETS, this strategy could be 
advantageous for Lufthansa. Another option would be the foundation of new subsidiary companies 
in countries excluded from market-based measures. This way, air transport services could be shifted 
to countries/airlines excluded from the EU ETS. Against this background, a considerable carbon 
leakage can be expected. A quantitative estimation of the carbon leakage due to the ICAO exemption 
clause, however, is a complicated issue since airlines’ strategic options to abscond from the EU ETS 
requirements are numerous, as indicated above. Therefore, we decided to refrain from modelling the 
carbon leakage in full. What can be estimated, however, is the amount of CO2 emissions not covered 
by the EU ETS if the ICAO exemption clause is applied. Table 9 presents these estimations. 
Evidently, at least 20 to 50 per cent of the CO2 emissions originally covered by the EU ETS would not 
be regulated any more if the ICAO exemption clause was introduced, depending on the 
interpretation of the exemption clause. 
Table 9. CO2 emissions not covered by the EU ETS if the ICAO exemption clause is applied 
Year 
 
 
 
 
Base case: CO2 
emissions covered 
by the EU ETS in 
million tonnes  
 
CO2 emissions not 
covered if ICAO 
exemption clause a) 
applied in million 
tonnes 
CO2 emissions not 
covered if ICAO 
exemption clause b) 
applied in million 
tonnes 
 
CO2 emissions not 
covered if ICAO 
exemption clause a) 
applied in per cent 
 
CO2 emissions not 
covered if ICAO 
exemption clause b) 
applied in per cent 
 
2010 204.40 40.24 100.64 19.73 49.33 
2020 299.13 61.28 146.82 20.49 49.08 
Source: DLR model results. 
 
From both a cost and CO2 perspective, the best solution would be the introduction of a unified and 
globally applied ETS for aviation. This way, competitive distortions and carbon leakages could be 
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avoided to the best possible extent. A second-best option would be the harmonizing of provisions of 
different emissions trading schemes. This may become crucial since the introduction of a number of 
emissions trading schemes tackling climate change both on a national as well as on a supranational 
level is foreseeable within the next decade. Up to now, detailed plans for mandatory or voluntary 
national emissions trading systems influencing aviation have been worked out by New Zealand, 
Australia, the US and Canada (for discussion, see Scheelhaase, 2011). 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper, we estimated the cost effects of the inclusion of the aviation sector in the European 
emission trading system (EU ETS) in the short term as well as in the longer term. For this purpose, a 
newly-enhanced simulation model is employed which enables the estimation of air transport’s 
performance and CO2 emissions up to the year 2020. Also, the cost impacts of the ICAO exemption 
clause for market-based measures such as the EU ETS are investigated for the first time. Our main 
conclusions are as follows: 
If the European Commission politically succeeds in integrating European and non-European carriers 
into the EU ETS as intended, about one third of global aviation CO2 emissions will be regulated. 
Even though the Court of Justice of the EU ruled in favour of the European Commission in 
December 2011, many countries opposed to the inclusion of non-European airlines in the EU ETS. 
Apart from very few exceptions, all passenger airlines will need to purchase allowances for their 
flight operations in addition to those allocated for free. Moreover, a continuous increase in costs can 
be expected due to aviation growth. In the year 2020, more than 50 per cent of the required 
allowances will have to be purchased.  
Even though about 1,175 million allowances will be allocated for free, the aviation sector will have to 
buy allowances for approximately 20.5 to 41 billion € in the timeframe 2012 to 2020 at an assumed 
allowance price of between 20 € and 40 €. This is because aviation emissions growth will outpace any 
foreseeable autonomous efficiency gains. Interestingly, our estimations of the historical emissions of 
the aviation sector under the EU ETS differ noticeably from the estimations published by the 
European Commission in March 2011. While the European Commission decided the historical 
emissions of the years 2004-2006 to be 219 million tonnes CO2, our modelling results are about 20 per 
cent lower. These differences can only be partly explained by a lack of data on flight movements, 
APU fuel use and other not publicly available information. The amount of the historical emissions 
directly influences airlines’ costs for purchasing emission allowances.  
An analysis of the exemption provision laid out in ICAO Resolution A37-19, as agreed in October 
2010, revealed that this clause has significant potential to distort competition in the airline sector if 
applied to the EU ETS. Furthermore, roughly 20 to 50 per cent of the CO2 emissions originally 
covered by the EU ETS would not be regulated any more, depending on the interpretation of the 
ICAO exemption clause. Furthermore, airline groups may shift operations to airlines excluded from 
the EU ETS. As of September 2012, a possible application of the ICAO exemption to the EU ETS is 
under discussion on the political level. 
This leads to the conclusion that from the perspective of competition policy, a unified and globally 
applied ETS would be the best solution. This way, earlier findings of Scheelhaase et al. (2010), 
Schaefer et al. (2010) as well as Yuen and Zhang (2011) can be supported. A second-best approach 
could be the linking of different regional ETSs. This approach could at least partially create a level 
playing field. Nevertheless, if the consideration of comparable measures in the EU ETS, as envisaged 
in the current legal EU framework, is practically adopted, we expect fundamental problems in the 
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compatibility and comparability of the EU ETS with measures adopted elsewhere. This will lead to 
competitive distortions in the aviation sector. 
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